We begin with a general discussion of the ways in which the concept of taste has been treated, moving on to what is sometimes taken as a (if not the) controversy in the field. That controversy centres on the apparent differences between sociopolitical accounts (Bourdieu) and psychological-emotional accounts (Campbell) of taste. What we then show is that the distinction is just that: apparent, on the surface only. What it conceals is a more deep-seated agreement between the two schools about what it is to be a human subject. Here we take our cue from 
universally subjective. Taste is simultaneously subjective, in that it relates to individual perceptions and universally subjective, in that to rise to the status of the 'beautiful' it needs to be communicated and validated with others. Hence:
The first of these I may call the taste of sense, the second, the taste of reflection: the first laying down judgements merely private, the second, on the other hand, judgements ostensibly of general validity (public), but both alike being aesthetic (not practical) judgements about an object merely in respect of the bearing of its representation on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (Kant 1952: 54) .
Kant elaborates on this by suggesting that taste as a sense -that is 'taste of the tongue, the palate and the throat' and what may 'be agreeable to the eye and ear' -is based on private feeling and is restricted in scope to the individual (1952: 51) . In universal subjectivity, or what is generally considered as 'good taste', taste is an idea that we communicate and, in so doing, 'we believe ourselves to be speaking with a universal voice, and lay claim to the concurrence of every one ' (1952: 56) . Kant continues:
The judgement of taste itself does not postulate the agreement of every one (for it is only competent for a logically universal judgement to do this, in that it is able to bring forward reasons); it only imputes this agreement to every one, as an instance of the rule in respect of which it looks for confirmation, not from concepts, but from the concurrence of others (1952: 56) .
Brillat-Savarin (at least on Barthes' reading) replays Kant's hierarchy of taste as the 'tiering of taste.' Barthes comments on this tiering when he notes that Brillat-Savarin 'decomposes the gustatory sensation in time' as: 1 direct (when the flavour is still acting on the front of the tongue); 3 reflective (at the final moment of judgement).
All the luxury of taste is found in this scale; submitting the gustatory sensation to time actually allows it to develop somewhat in the manner of a narrative, or of a language (Barthes 1985: 61) . Accordingly -that is, because the concept of taste can be so elusive as to offer no concrete empirical research options -there has been intensive speculation over the mechanics of food choice and the taste-acceptability of food from a vast raft of disciplinary perspectives, including the biological, the anthropological, the psychological and the sociological (Rozin 1982; Douglas and Gross 1981; Falconer et al. 1993; Glanz et al. 1990; Mennell 1996; Mennell et al. 1992; McIntosh 1996; Gronow 1997) . For all this endeavor, the answer to the food choice question necessarily remains a riddle -there is (and can be) no one correct response and no one correct combination of responses that can best fit either the private or the public version of 'taste,' let alone the pair as a whole. Despite this, the issue is routinely simplified, as Santich (1996: 18) concludes when posing the question 'so why do we eat what we eat?' and answering: 'Because that's the way we were born, the way we are -and because we like those flavours.' The question, then, remains effectively unresolved vis-à-vis what it is that actually determines preferences for some flavors over others. And, as we shall see, there is a very good (almost built-in) reason for this deep unsatisfiability.
Taking another angle and going a little further than Santich's somewhat tautological and commonsensical solution to the problem, Falk (1994: 79) asks:
'how can other's food become our food?'; how do we learn to adopt food that we have not been exposed to historically or culturally -'because that's the way we were born'? This question lies at the root of the success of what is sometimes called 'ethnic' food, as if there were a food that were not. In this vein, considering distinctions between 'our' food and 'theirs,' Bourdieu and Campbell have both tried to problematize the taste, fashion and pleasure nexus with more subtle responses, with both effectively anchoring the question of taste in a group of related (and more fundamental) concepts. For Bourdieu, these anchoring concepts are ultimately social; for Campbell they are deeply psychological -the two (let alone the combination of the two as the 'poles' of taste studies) thereby preserving the Kantian public-private duality, as we shall see. i Bourdieu's thesis centres on his concept of habitus:
The habitus is both the generative principle of objectively classifiable judgements and the system of classification … of these practices. It is in the relationship between the two capacities which define the habitus, the capacity to produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products (taste), that the represented social world, i.e., the space of life-styles, is constituted (Bourdieu 1984: 170) .
Here, according to Featherstone (1987: 123) : 'tastes and lifestyle preferences, which in our society are frequently individualized, are therefore a product of a specific habitus which in turn can be related to the volume of economic and cultural capital possessed....' Hence 'the position a particular occupation, age or gender category, class or class fraction occupies can be mapped onto the social space.' So, for Bourdieu and those who follow him, taste is ultimately predicated on social class and the affirmation of class boundaries. Food choice is therefore, according to Coveney's (1996: 50) critical summary, about 'positioning people in accordance with their class expectations and their collective consciousness, it is therefore what distinguishes one group from another.' Bourdieu himself goes on to argue that the manifestation of taste and its use to delineate social groups is more about 'distaste.' That is, 'in matters of taste, more than anywhere else, all determination is negation; and tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes, disgust provoked by horror or visceral intolerance ("sick-making") of the tastes of others' (Bourdieu 1984: 56 (Gabriel and Lang 1995: 113; our emphasis) . iii For Campbell, modern consumption is effectively reducible to modern hedonism and is characterized by a longing for pleasures generated through the psychological activity of day-dreaming. According to Gabriel and Lang's (1995: 104) critical summary of this position, hedonism has moved on from the traditional 'hedonism of sensations attached to the senses' to seeking 'pleasure not in sensation but in emotion accompanying all kinds of experiences. ' Campbell's (1987: 77) argument is therefore that: pleasure is sought via emotional and not merely sensory stimulation, whilst, secondly, the images which fulfil this function are either imaginatively created or modified by the individual for self-consumption, there being little reliance upon the presence of 'real' stimuli. Campbell (1987: 89) goes on to say that the essential activity of consumption is not about the machinations of selection, purchase and use. Instead, it involves Taste/page 6 'the imaginative pleasure-seeking to which the product image lends itself, "real" consumption being largely a resultant of this "mentalistic" hedonism.' At this point it is perhaps wise to rehearse Gabriel and Lang's caution over Campbell's very singular view of the consumer as pleasure-seeker. Consumption, for them, is about selection and purchase of commodities, so that both the domestic consumer and the tourist are more complex than simply one-dimensional hedonists. Gabriel and Lang (1995: 109) associate with those familiar products currently being consumed' (Campbell 1987: 89) . Campbell goes on to argue that the consumer seeks out the novel rather than the familiar because this 'enables him to believe that its acquisition and use can supply experiences which he has not so far encountered in reality ' (1987: 89) .
Yet the consumer needs to situate the novel within a framework of the psychologically familiar in order to maximize the pleasures that it can deliverto be able to day-dream about something requires pre-given knowledges and expectations.
For Bourdieu, apparently by contrast, pleasure emerges as the central theme for the new middle classes, where it has metamorphosed from an old morality of duty simpliciter to a new morality of pleasure as a duty.
Thus whereas the old morality of duty, based on the opposition between pleasure and good, induces a generalized suspicion of the 'charming and attractive,' a fear of pleasure and a relation to the body made up of 'reserve,' 'modesty' and 'restraint,' and associates every satisfaction of the forbidden impulses with guilt, the new ethical avant-garde urges a morality of pleasure as a duty. This doctrine makes it a failure, a threat to self-esteem not to 'have fun.' ... Pleasure is not only permitted but demanded, on ethical as much as on scientific grounds (Bourdieu 1984: 367) . iv Featherstone furthers this role of the new middle classes whereby the emergence of pleasure as a duty transforms those classes into 'cultural intermediaries' with 'an interest in searching for new cultural goods, re-discovering old fashion, destabilising existing symbolic hierarchies to make the social space more fluid' (Featherstone 1987: 131) . This role of cultural intermediary is best exemplified by Appadurai (1988) when he discusses the role of the middle class as taste-makers in the making and remaking of a national cuisine through the medium of cookbooks.
But, at the end of the day, are the 'grand theories' of a Bourdieu or a Campbell, any different -in their pragmatic and technical effect -from recipe books?
Could they be among the recipe books of the modern self? Or, to switch metaphors, even if Bourdieu's and Campbell's soups result in quite distinct tastes, could it still be that they are made from the same basic stock?
On the surface, Bourdieu's position appears as the very antithesis of the Campbell school of thought on taste: social distinctions (rather than emotional and psychological states) appear to underpin questions of taste. Yet, and this is important, the two positions (roughly associable with Campbell and Bourdieu respectively) make the same epistemological shift. Both positions de-emphasize actual, material and sensory cases of tasting and ground them in transcendental categories. It hardly matters, at this level, whether those transcendental categories are psycho-emotional (Campbell) or socio-political (Bourdieu) . Both, for all their surface differences, preserve a Kantian version of a human subject caught between, on the one hand, empirical-sensory events in a material world (as Kant would say, of the flesh) and, on the other, transcendental conditions which are the ultimate roots of such events but which are, in themselves, utterly deracinated ideals. v Let us further explore this fundamental assumption at the heart of the two seemingly very distinct accounts of taste.
We can summarize this by means of a simple matrix:
Social distinction ⇑ Tasting as 'sense' Novelty (as social difference)
Campbell:
Psychological drive ⇑ Tasting as 'sense' Novelty (as new pleasures)
What is critically present in both schools, then, is an initial and abiding separation of the human subject into its empirical (sensory) and transcendental (general conditional) components. This is the model of 'man' that Foucault, in
The Order of Things (1972) Here the public-private distinction, so important to the thinking-style of modernity, is considerably loosened. At the level of technique, either 'zone' can be effected and acted on identically. Or rather, the distinction between public 'good taste' and individual (sensory) tasting is re-valued as a distinction between ethical 'sites' corresponding to the two hemispheres of the Kantian self. We find the same rhetorical tropes in, for example, food advertisements where consumers are not only told a particular food is fashionable (publicly distributed) but also extremely good for an individual to eat and beneficial to their bodily health. In both 'high theory' and popular culture, then, we find the same techniques applied to the self by which 'individuals come to construe, decipher, act upon themselves in relation to the true and false' (Rose 1992: 144; cf. Foucault 1984 cf. Foucault , 1985 cf. Foucault , 1988 cf. Foucault , 1989 ). What appears as 'true' is any discourse which recognisably and accountably reproduces Western 'man' as the empirico-transcendental doublet.
Contrastively, what appears as 'false' is any discourse which even begins to question this version of the subject as what we fundamentally are and always have been -unproblematically.
Taste, then, finally, is an ensemble of (largely rhetorical) techniques for reaffirming a very particular and limited story about ourselves -albeit one that has (because it produces the conditions for) an effective aura of truth. None of the presently available discourses on taste, then, can tell us what it is: for they must all count as 'true' on our reading. While the present paper has so far problematized this issue, we still await a fully-fledged account that runs radically counter to the currently dominant and very restrictive 'true story' of human being and how it tastes.
Can we begin to imagine another account of taste that mobilizes a different and distinct ethics -where, by 'ethics', we refer to any general account of human being, to our ethos? That is, can there be a way of thinking of taste that is at least somewhat beyond what we have so far encountered in Campbell and Bourdieu: a Taste/page 11 fundamentally Kantian version of 'man' as the 'empirico-transcendental doublet' (Foucault 1972: 303-343 )?
We could start with an utterly sceptical alternative as a working hypothesis. This would run: 'taste' is always an abstract concept; it has much the same status as 'memory', 'love' and 'goodness'; to that extent it is properly a matter for metaphysical speculation only; it has no place in the social sciences. Now this would be attractive were it not for its re-singularisation of taste -perhaps as a radical response to both Bourdieu and Campbell's dualisms -and were it not for the fact that it would make studies of taste, as concrete consumer practices, impossible. It also neglects the fact that taste can be (though it need not be) a purely physiological matter. So let us see if we can progress the initial hypothesis into something slightly more workable for practical social-scientific investigation.
The problems with the 'ineffability of taste' thesis suggest a further tripartite distinction -which we forward again, to some extent, for the purposes of argument and also knowing that we are still echoing Kant:
1. Taste as physiological fact; E.g., 'This food tastes bitter' (Fact).
2. Taste as subjective judgment; E.g., 'This food tastes good' (Value A).
3. Taste as public judgment; E.g., 'He has good taste in food' (Value B).
Clearly, the social sciences will have little interest in the first two of these. They are the provinces of food science and aesthetics respectively. The third domain, we suggest, is the main locus at which questions of consumption arise and, accordingly, where social scientific interest should be concentrated. judgments of taste for example. And they do this not as scientific or pseudoscientific propositions, but in quite different and distinct discourses (or language games). The form of life of science (and its logical reasoning) is not the same as the everyday (and its locally-specific, effective reasoning).
What the early Wittgenstein had forgotten, if we may be so bold, is an important distinction made by Alfred Schütz (1962: 34-47) Castaway 2: I take a beautifully lean oyster blade steak, seared and sealed on both sides. Then I sauce it lightly in a mixture of onions, basil and white wine. And then, next to it I nestle a scoop of tender macaroni tossed with herbs and alongside that crunchy snow peas. Taste/page 15 And then, finally, I top off the steak with black olives and melted slices of mozzarella cheese.
Castaway 1: Oooh Charles, you've really excelled yourself this time.
Castaway 3: Best ever! (Their raft bumps into a large ship and a ladder is let down.)
Castaway 1: Isn't that always the way, right in the middle of dinner.
Taste is clearly shown through this kind of trope, if not said in so many words.
(You read or watch the ad. and you taste at least something that may or may not have been actually tasted.) What is happening here is that a taste is made tellable.
To be tellable, something extraordinary has to be envisaged and depicted.
Ordinary life as usual is not tellable. Actual practical acts of 'tasting' (type-2)
have to be fabricated into absolutes (type-3): 'Best ever!'. As Harvey Sacks reminds us, there is an embargo on the statement of the utterly obvious -we are not obliged, for example, always to answer 'truthfully' to the greeting 'How are you?' -because it's a greeting not a request for information (Sacks 1975) . To put matters of taste (in the type-3 sense) on the agenda is to create an ordinary account of the recognisably -tastably -unobvious, the remark-able, the tellable. vii As we said, taste is like memory, love and goodness. To tell you I have a memory of taking a knife from my kitchen drawer this morning to butter my toast is not a legitimate piece of telling. It utterly lacks tellability, for all its truth.
To tell you that I took it out of the drawer to stab a burglar is tellable. Ditto for taste. It requires the quotidian accounting of something routinely outside the quotidian itself. And it is on these grounds that all forms of consumer culturefrom logos and brands to advertising campaigns -depend. The advertisement below puts the matter succinctly -it effectively self-analyses: viii Taste/page 16 This is an example of how we make our own interpretations of our 'taste' and our 'tastes'. This is not 'Taste' in any utterly absolute sense. To that extent the To that end, here's a third -though much more famous -fragment of taste 'data':
And then suddenly the memory came to me: it was the taste of a morsel of madeleine that my Aunt Léonie used to dip in her tea or in her infusion of lime and give me to sip when I went to her bedroom to say good morning on Sundays.... Before I tasted the little cake that my mother had given me, the sight of it had not reminded me of anything; I had often seen them since the Combray days, displayed in cake-shops, but had never eaten any, which may be why their appearance had become divorced from those days and associated with more recent times... (Proust 1982: 34 Lupton (1996: 35) elaborates on this when she argues that the 'revulsion for the food eaten by another is a common expression of discrimination and xenophobia, a means of distinguishing between social groups.' iii . Lury (1996: 72) This deep connection between action and talk is remarkably close to that of Harvey Sacks in one of his earliest papers 'Sociological Description' (1963) where he imagines culture as a machine with two parts: the doing and the talking part. Of course, by the end of the paper, the separation is utterly spurious: it cannot be made with any analytic precision. If we want to know, as sociologists do, how people act in the world, we need not describe their actions from a distance, as if they were atoms or electrons;
rather we need to find ways of describing how they, themselves, tell of (interpret or analyse) their actions -in and as speech-actions in their own right. There need to be further investigations into the connections between Sacks's and Arendt's (different but related) dis-solutions of the speech/act(ion) distinction and their ramifications for a radically alternative sociology of culture. x .
A further possibility for research is the role played by the crucial Arendtian faculties of 'promising' and 'forgiving' in telling others about Taste/page 21 our tastes. Because the upshots of our actions are unknowable in advance, and because our actions are irrevocable once carried out, we have to be able to 'promise' (go forward together) and 'forgive' (redeem each others' mis-deeds): 'forgiving and making promises are like control mechanisms built into the very faculty to start new and unending processes ' (2000: 181) .
